Heena Cho | January 6th, 2025
Professor Owen D. Jones is the Director of the Weaver Family Program in Law, Brain Sciences, and Behavior at Vanderbilt University. Professor Jones also serves as both a Professor of Law and a Professor of Biological Sciences. Additionally, he is a key contributor to the recent publication “Brain Science for Lawyers, Judges, and Policymakers,” a text that discusses the intersection of neuroscience and law.
As neuroscience continues to lend insight into the complexities of human behavior, its application to the legal system offers unprecedented opportunities to refine justice. The brain, as the biological foundation of decision-making and impulse control, contains vital information that could change how courts determine guilt, intention, and accountability. Considering neuroscientific implications would allow for a more flexible and tailored approach in a wide variety of legal contexts.
In an interview with Professor Jones, we address the challenges in applying neuroscientific evidence to legal trials as well as its ethical considerations and potential for future advancements.
The Vanguard: Can you share your primary goal for the publication “Brain Science for Lawyers, Judges, and Policymakers”?
Jones: Our goal was to make neuroscientific evidence more accessible to the legal community without oversimplifying the science. This work comes from a project funded by the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience aimed at creating a law and neuroscience research network. Through this network, we conducted experiments, published findings, and sought to educate the legal system on how to distinguish credible neuroscientific evidence from less reliable claims. We wanted our publication to offer a concise but sophisticated introduction, avoiding heavy jargon while illustrating both the strengths and limitations of the technology. We also aimed to give non-scientists a basic understanding of brain function and organization.
The Vanguard: One concept that appears in the text is that of the “double-edged sword” of using neuroscience in the courtroom, where brain evidence might be viewed as either mitigating or aggravating in legal contexts. Could you expand on that?
Jones: The double-edged sword refers to the idea that neuroscience can suggest that a defendant might not be fully responsible for their actions in the traditional sense. In a criminal case, for instance, if neuroscience indicates that someone has diminished control over their behavior, it can work in their favor by lessening their perceived moral responsibility. However, it can also backfire. If the person is seen as more dangerous due to brain abnormalities, they may end up with a longer sentence because of the perceived risk they pose to society. This concept plays a role in both the guilt-determination and sentencing phases, where the perception of an individual’s responsibility and potential danger are weighed carefully.
The Vanguard: What are some key challenges in presenting neuroscience evidence in courtrooms?
Jones: One major challenge is helping the triers of fact — juries or judges — understand how a person’s brain structure and function relate to the legal issues at hand. Most people lack background knowledge of brain anatomy, neuron function, and how these aspects impact behavior, decision-making, and perception. So, the first challenge is offering a general understanding of brain function, and the second is explaining the unique workings of the specific individual’s brain.
Presenting this evidence also means explaining the technologies used to analyze brain function. For instance, brain imaging can reveal structural or functional information, but connecting these features to behavior relevant to the case can require complex interpretation and expert testimony. Another issue is ensuring that people understand that a brain image alone doesn’t say much until it’s interpreted — interpretation is crucial and not always straightforward.
The Vanguard: Could you touch on the ethical considerations when using neuroscience evidence in legal proceedings?
Jones: The foremost ethical concern is that lawyers don’t overstate what neuroscientific evidence means. This is particularly important because jurors and judges often give high weight to scientific evidence, which can be problematic if the studies presented aren’t well-designed, executed, or interpreted. Both prosecution and defense have a responsibility to bring robust, properly interpreted science to the courtroom. Beyond courtroom ethics, there are broader ethical concerns in policymaking, especially around brain conditions or mental illnesses that could affect behavior. The legal system must balance issues of diminished responsibility with public safety, considering how to handle cases involving individuals with conditions like Alzheimer’s, traumatic brain injuries from sports or military service, and other factors that affect responsibility.
The Vanguard: What areas of neuroscience research do you see holding the most promise for future legal applications?
Jones: One exciting area is brain-machine interfaces, which could allow people to control devices with brain signals. This is being developed with people with disabilities in mind, but there’s no reason it couldn’t extend to those without disabilities in the future. In legal contexts, we could see neuroscience contributing to areas like pain detection, which would be transformative for tort litigation. If we could objectively assess pain levels rather than relying on subjective reports, it would greatly impact cases involving pain and suffering.
Research on the adolescent and young adult brain also holds potential, as we’re learning how different these are from mature adult brains. This knowledge might lead us to reconsider how we treat young adults in the legal system. For instance, we know that young adults are highly influenced by peer perception, a sensitivity that diminishes with age. These insights could influence how we judge culpability and responsibility for this age group in the future.
The Vanguard: On a related note, do you think using neuroscientific evidence when trying juveniles might lead to fairer trials?
Jones: It depends. Historically, we haven’t needed neuroscience to argue that juveniles are not as morally responsible as adults. The legal system has long treated minors as less culpable. However, neuroscience adds depth by explaining why young people may lack full capacity. For example, an immature myelination process in the brain, which insulates neurons, could mean that younger people don’t process responsibility the same way adults do. This perspective could enrich discussions on culpability and potentially influence legal outcomes.
Professor Jones’s insights underscore the complex but promising relationship between neuroscience and law. As research advances, the legal field may have to increasingly rely on neuroscience to inform judgments, thus opening itself up to new ethical debates and interpretative challenges along the way.